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ABSTRACT
Redefining the approach and philosophy that
operations management uses to define,
develop, and implement space missions will
be a central element in achieving high
efficiency mission operations for the future.
The goal of a cost effective space operations
program cannot be realized if the attitudes
and methodologies we currently employ to
plan, develop, and manage space missions do
not change. A management philosophy that
is in synch with the environment in terms of
budget, technology, and science objectives
must be developed. Changing our basic
perception of mission operations will require
a shift in the way we view the mission. This
requires a transition from current practices of
viewing the mission as a unique end product,
to a "mission development concept" built on
the visualization of the end-to-end mission.
To achieve this change we must define
realistic mission success criteria and develop
pragmatic approaches to achieve our goals.
Custom mission development for all but the
largest and most unique programs is not
practical in the current budget environment,
and we simply do not have the resources to
implement all of our planned science
programs. We need to shift our management
focus to allow us the opportunity make use
of methodologies and approaches which are
based on common building blocks that can
be utilized in the space, ground, and mission
unique segments of all missions.
INTRODUCTION
Over the last several decades the space
program has moved from an unbroken series
of spectacular successes to a disquieting
number of stunning failures. These failures
have affected all participants in the space
community: DoD, NASA, NOAA, and the
commercial sector. On the surface there
appears to be no common thread: booster
failures; kick motor failures; unsuccessful
shroud separations; component level failures;
or operator error at the command console.
We seem to be back on the road to success.
The Hubble Servicing Mission and GOES 8
launch have broken the streak of recent
failures, but have we really solved the
underlying problems that have been causing
our recent failures?
The space community, like government and
industry in general, has become a victim to a
system of management that has become
mired in bureaucracy and inefficiency.
TOTAL MISSION MANAGEMENT
The fin'st, and possibly most important, step
in redefining mission management, is the
development of an integrated management
approach. In our current organizational
environment there are simply too many levels
of management, too many discrete
organizations, and a diluted system of
responsibility, authority, and accountability.
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This type of organizationalstructurefosters
inefficiency,duplicationof effort, convoluted
lines of communications,and in the final
stages of a mission, cost and schedule
overrunsor total missionfailures.
Placinga satelliteinto orbit andconducting
missionoperationsis an immenselycomplex
task in its own right. Adding in additional
levelsof confusionandcomplexitythat area
function of over managementjust makesa
difficult task harder to accomplishand adds
unnecessaryrisk to theprogram.
A typical DoD or NASA missionpossesses
threemajormanagementtiers:
1. ProgramManagement
2. ProjectManagement
3. MissionManagement
Below thesemajor tiers are the subsystem
level managementgroups that overseethe
design and implementation of mission
componentsand functionality. Thismulti-
tiered approachlends itself to inefficiency,
redundancy,andduplicationof effort. Each
lower tier of managementis larger than its
precedingtier andaddsto the bureaucracy,
extendslines of communication,and dilutes
authority.
Theonly way to eliminatethis problemis to
redefine the management organization.
While thethreelevelsmustcontinueto exist,
the numbersof personnelandthe functions
performedmustchangeradically.
Program Management
Program Management must continue to exist
at the agency level. The Program Level is
responsible for overall budget, schedule, and
interagency coordination, but these must be
the only functions that Program Level
management performs. Micro managing the
spacecraft, ground segment, or science
compliment should not be the concern of this
level of management.
Project Management
Project Management should continue to exist
at the implementing center, but the focus of
Project Management should change
drastically. Project Management should shift
its level of activity from overseeing the
overseer of implementation to serving as the
spearhead for planning mission operations.
This planning should be performed with a
core team of representatives from the space,
ground, and science communities from the
very beginning of the mission planning
process.
With the major mission segments
participating in an integrated initial mission
planning process directed by the Project
Manager, problems that are normally
identified late in the implementation phase
can be rectified or even avoided early in the
mission development process.
Mission design should be the operational
focus of Project Management, with cost and
schedule management as a secondary
responsibility. An organization tasked with
this responsibility would significantly shrink
the personnel requirements of the Project
Level. The mission design itself should be
driven by what is most practical in terms of
meeting the science mission objectives and
allow the scientific and ground system
considerations to drive the design of
spacecraft subsystems as opposed to our
current method of building the mission
around the platform. Figure 1 depicts the
proposed organization structure.
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Most missions that actually achieve orbit and
successfully complete the early orbit
checkout phase tend to outlive their effective
design lives by several hundred percent. This
stretching of the on-orbit operations phase of
the system lifecycle tends to make
Operations & Maintenance (O&M) one of
the most expensive elements of the mission.
For example, on the Hubble Space
Telescope, the cost to place the spacecraft
into orbit with its supporting ground system
was approximately $ 2.1 billion. The O&M
budget estimated in 1990 was $ 200 million
per year. With a fifteen year on orbit life, the
cost of O&M will exceed the cost to launch
by 50%
Other missions which have exceeded their
planned lifetime such as NIMBUS-7, ICE,
IUE, ERBS, IMP, Solar Max, and Landsat 4
& 5 have exceeded this O&M cost factor by
several hundred percent as depicted in Figure
2.
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Figure 2 Mission Life vs. Design Life
By allowing the science and ground system
elements to drive the design of the
spacecraft, and by updating the technology
that is used to control the spacecraft and
process the mission data, significant
reductions in O&M costs can be realized.
The fact that these savings can be real and
significant over time are borne out by the
high level of interest in low cost mission
operations concepts such as JPL's
LOCOMO and GSFC' s Renaissance
programs.
This macro level of mission design and
sustaining support is where the Project Level
should concentrate its efforts.
Mission Management
Mission Management which currently lives
as a small component of the Project Level,
and the major component of the on-orbit
level of management should shift its focus
from a mostly on-orbit organization to the
management of the mission implementation
as well as conducting day-to-day mission
operations.
By placing responsibility and authority for
the implementation into the hands of the
organization which must live with the results
of the final system, two key outcomes will
materialize:
o A system development monitored and
managed by the actual users will result in
a system that is designed with operations
in mind.
. The operations managers become a true
stakeholder in the total mission system
and an organization that can blame no
one but themselves for a poor or overly
complicated system.
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METHODOLOGY
With an organizational structure in place
which has the authority and accountability to
make major design decisions, the primary
methods required to create a successful
design are:
1. A systems approach to the mission.
2. An understanding of what technology is
available that can support a low cost
mission design.
3. A clear vision (operations concept) of
how the mission will be conducted.
requirements for the total mission. From a
technology standpoint the following
questions must be answered:
1. How can technology be used to lower
mission risk while reducing overall costs?
2. Where will technology take us in terms
of spacecraft, ground systems, and
support infrastructure?
3. How can operations concept developers
use evolving technology to lower O&M
costs?
4. How can we plan and design for
tomorrow's missions when the state-of-
the-art is advancing so rapidly?
Systems Approach
Under a systems approach, the mission is
viewed as a total system that consists of five
major components:
1. A science objective.
2. A management approach.
3. A spacecraft and instrument suite.
4. A ground support system.
5. A mission operations plan.
These components exist as individual threads
which are intertwined to form a common
cord of mission design. As a system, any
changes to any given thread will have some
impact on the overall mission design. As a
system these threads must function in
concert to achieve the end goal of a space
mission that meets its scientific objectives for
a reasonable cost.
The intelligent use of technology has to be an
integral element of operations management's
philosophy. We are beginning to see this
happen as concepts from Total Quality
Management (TQM) move from a buzz
word phase into actual implementation.
Integrated product teams are becoming more
common, and in some agencies are officially
tasked to develop designs driven by a low
risk and low cost operations model.
Technology is also important in terms of
consolidating operations to achieve budget
goals. The USAF and NOAA are currently
heavily involved in planning for a converged
polar meteorological program where a single
spacecraft type and single ground control
element operate a mission to serve both civil
and military users.
Spacecraft Trends
Technology
When a clear vision of what the mission is
intended to look like is developed, the
integrated design team must evaluate the
available technology and determine what
components or approaches will best meet the
The spacecraft itself can become a major
means of reducing both cost and risk to the
total mission design. New generation On-
Board Computers (OBCs) are capable of
providing 256K of memory, coupled with
micro-processor controlled instrument and
spacecraft subsystems, a capability exists to
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build very high levelsof autonomyinto the
spacecraftitself. The additionof products
into the spacecraft such as Global
Positioning Satellite (GPS) receivers can
provideaspacecraftcapableof generatingits
own on-board ephemeris,performing free
attitude determination(2 receiver/4antenna
configuration), and configuring itself for
ground contacts. All of this can be done
now, with greateraccuracythan is currently
provided by ground or TDRSS based
tracking. It canalsobedoneat a fractionof
the staffing levels we currently need to
performtheseservicesontheground.
The questionsthat needto be askedat the
designphaseare:
1. Is this capability required for this
mission?
2. Will this capabilitysaveme moneyand
reducerisk over thetotal lifecycleof the
mission?
If theanswersto eitherof thesequestionsare
yes then a cost/benefitsanalysismust be
conductedto determine:
1. If thesecapabilitiesareneededto ensure
missionsuccessandreducingrisk.
2. How muchmoneycan be savedduring
on-orbit operationsby spendinga more
onthe spacecraft.
This maymakelife morecomplicatedfor the
spacecraft designer, but the spacecraft
designeris only one player in the mission
systems.
Ground Systems
Ground system design and capabilities have
matured at the greatest rate because the
ground system is not constrained by the
environmental requirements the spacecraft
must withstand. Ground system technology
is also directly tied to computer hardware,
software, and networking technology, and
we have the ability to access the ground
system on a daily basis. Although the
potential capability in this area has improved
significantly, the implementation of this
technology has lagged.
The centralized ground system support
architecture was designed and implemented
in the 70's using a mainframe based
approach. This approach made sense
because an economy of scale could be
achieved when many missions shared a
common service. However, advances in
ground system technology have made the
cost savings of the 70's a cost sink in the
90's.
Existing Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS)
hardware and software have the ability to
reduce or eliminate our reliance on large
institutional support elements which have
extensive O&M requirements. Advances in
ground system telemetry front-end
processors have reduced the workload now
performed by Pacor to the level of a few
programmable cards which perform all tasks
from bit synch through Reed Solomon
correction. A two GPS configuration on the
spacecraft itself can reduce support
requirements from the Flight Dynamics
Facility (FDF) from daily staffing to launch
and accent support only.
In the final analysis the ground system can be
reduced to four major components:
1. A tracking facility.
2. A communications segment.
3. A control center.
4, A science operations center.
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This approach provides a control center
capable of directly providing Level 0 data
and telemetry directly to a science operations
center. The key infrastructure support
element in this scenario is a reliable
communications infrastructure.
Science Operations Centers (SOC)
The availability of inexpensive multi-
processor workstation technology has an
unlimited capability to reduce the costs
associated with science data processing and
product generation in terms of both the
computer resources required to perform the
tasks, and the science operations staffing
levels needed to control and monitor the
product generation process.
With science data and supporting telemetry
being provided directly to the SOC by the
flight control center, a multiprocessor
product generation environment can allow
science product operations to be reduced to
a single shift activity, and at the same time
minimize the physical facilities and personnel
requirements in the SOC.
Operations Concepts
The f'mal element in redefining operations
management is the development of mission
operations concepts that will allow
automation and smart technology to provide
the majority of the "cradle-to-grave"
monitoring and support tasks for on-orbit
missions. How this task is handled can have
a considerable impact in reducing O&M
costs. These tasks are now performed by
implementing round the clock staffing. To
cover a nominal mission day, a staffing factor
of 4.0 persons per position is required to
provide the minimum level of staffing needed
to provide real-time spacecraft services. In
the typical control center this factor is
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applied to the Shift Supervisor, Command
Controller, Ground Controller, and Payload
Evaluator.
Using approaches such as compressed
health and safety telemetry schemas, on-
board ground contact configuration
capability, and exception reporting, can
significantly contribute to reduced (50-66%)
control center staffing requirements.
The same types of multiprocessor technology
recommended for use in the SOC combined
with COTS statistical analysis software can
be employed in the area of spacecraft
subsystem analysis. Traditionally this
function is performed using custom
developed software, and resides on either a
dedicated machine, or is resident within the
command and telemetry processing system.
This newer technology approach provides
scalability and portability that does not
currently exist in off-line ground systems
tasks, and reduces the operational load on
the real-time system. These off-line tasks;
such as mission planning and scheduling,
subsystem level telemetry analysis, and long
term performance trending lend themselves
to this type of solution because the are
normally Monday through Friday day shift
tasks which do not require sustained levels of
time-critical performance.
This scalable approach also allows the
addition of increased capability to be
achieved by using board level components
and cross compiling existing software as
opposed to adding new workstations or
personnel into the control center to meet
new requirements. In its most advanced
phase, this architecture can conceivably
provide multiple sateUite support from a
single operations center.
_i¸ !!_.......................................................
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:...... CONCLUSION
We must begin to embrace the mission as a
comprehensive system, not as a series of
' discreet components which are pulled
i'
together to and literally beaten into a
' configuration to perform a unified task.
With proper levels of planning and the
i
• support of high level agency management, a
macro-level mission approach can be
:: developed that will allow resources to be re-
directed into new missions. As a result of
organizational downsizing on a mission level
::: ..... project, we can minimize some of the
confusion and develop clear lines of
: communication, authority, and responsibility.
In the final analysis people will always be the
most expensive component of any mission.
Any personnel resources that can be
eliminated from a mission provide two
benefits:
L
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2.
A real cost reduction for the current
mission.
A resource which can be applied to a
new mission which up to now have not
been able to secure the resources
required to move from the concept into
the implementation phase.
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